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Summary 
This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource 
rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks 
to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global general equilibrium model with 
an intertemporal fossil resource sector. We calculate the optimal second-best renewable 
energy subsidy and compare the resulting welfare level with an efficient first-best carbon 
pricing policy. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by a 
multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range of parameters 
describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitution possibilities and normative 
attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small deviations from the second-best subsidy can 
lead to strong increases in emissions and consumption losses. This confirms the rising 
concerns about the occurrence of unintended side effects of climate policy { a new version of 
the green paradox. We extend our second-best analysis by considering two further types of 
policy instruments: (1) temporary subsidies that are displaced by carbon pricing in the long 
run and (2) revenue-neutral instruments like a carbon trust and a feed-in-tariff scheme. 
Although these instruments cause small welfare losses, they have the potential to ease 
distributional conflicts as they lead to lower energy prices and higher fossil resource rents 
than the optimal carbon pricing policy. 
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on wel-
fare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imper-
fect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We
use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil resource
sector. We calculate the optimal second-best renewable energy subsidy and
compare the resulting welfare level with an ecient rst-best carbon pricing
policy. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by
a multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range
of parameters describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitu-
tion possibilities and normative attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small
deviations from the second-best subsidy can lead to strong increases in emis-
sions and consumption losses. This conrms the rising concerns about the
occurrence of unintended side eects of climate policy { a new version of the
green paradox. We extend our second-best analysis by considering two fur-
ther types of policy instruments: (1) temporary subsidies that are displaced
by carbon pricing in the long run and (2) revenue-neutral instruments like a
carbon trust and a feed-in-tari scheme. Although these instruments cause
small welfare losses, they have the potential to ease distributional con
icts
as they lead to lower energy prices and higher fossil resource rents than the
optimal carbon pricing policy.
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11 Introduction
Policies to promote renewable energy technologies have a long tradition in
many OECD countries. Even before carbon pricing instruments (like the EU-
ETS in 2005) were implemented to reduce carbon emissions, many countries
had used subsidies, feed-in-taris (FIT) or public R&D spending to increase
the share of renewable energy (IEA 1997). As concerns about global warming
intensify due to new research results such as the latest IPCC (2007b) report
and the Stern (2007) Review, politicians and economists are debating about
the most eective mitigation policy. Many economists recommend putting
a price on carbon in form of taxes or emissions trading schemes (ETS) to
mitigate emissions at least costs (e.g. IPCC 2007a, p. 747). The academic
popularity of carbon pricing has given rise to a controversial debate on how
this instrument relates to renewable energy policies: Are both instruments
necessary to achieve mitigation targets at least costs or does the policy mix
increase compliance costs?
Basically, there are two strands of argumentations for implementing re-
newable energy specic policies: one is based on eciency grounds, the
other relies on pragmatic considerations promoting second-best policies that
are politically more feasible (see Bennear and Stavins (2007) for a general
discussion of the use of second-best instruments). The rst argumentation
claims that the energy sector is subject to multiple externalities like carbon
emissions, local air pollution, innovation and learning spillovers, imperfect
competition, network eects or energy security concerns (e.g. Fischer and
Preonas 2010; Sorrell and Sijm 2003; Unruh 2000). If the regulator imple-
ments only Pigouvian carbon taxes, emissions will be higher than under the
rst-best optimum (Grimaud et al. 2010). Likewise, if the regulator seeks to
achieve a certain emission target (by an ETS or by appropriate carbon taxes)
without further policy instruments, compliance costs will be higher than so-
cially optimal (Fischer and Newell 2008; Kalkuhl et al. 2011; Kverndokk and
Rosendahl 2007). The second, pragmatic argumentation stresses that dis-
tributional concerns and missing stakeholder support for (ecient) carbon
pricing may constitute political constraints which prevent the implementa-
tion of the rst-best policy: High carbon prices reduce prots and income
primarily in the fossil energy industry and lower-income households (Burtraw
et al. 2009; Metcalf 2008; Parry 2004; Parry and Williams III 2010). Addi-
tionally, unilateral carbon pricing can induce relocation of energy-intensive
industries (e.g. Markusen et al. 1993). A uniform global carbon tax or a
global ETS solves the relocation problem, but might be Utopian in the short
term as there is no practical experience how to negotiate and distribute rent
incomes and cost burdens. Ideological attitudes against carbon pricing poli-
2cies also play an important role: Carbon taxes face high opposition as taxes
in general are unpopular in wide parts of the US society (Newell et al. 2005).
The alternative to taxes, emissions trading, is criticized similarly by many
environmentalists and developing countries as being institutionally infeasible
or unfair. Distributional concerns and practical and information constraints
for compensation may be the most important reason why carbon pricing has
not yet been stringent if imposed at all. If exogenous constraints impede the
implementation of the rst-best instrument, a second-best approach can be a
valuable alternative (Bennear and Stavins 2007). In particular, technology-
optimistic considerations about the progress of the learning renewable en-
ergy technologies might lead to the perception that a temporary renewable
deployment stimulus could be a more manageable way to foster mitigation.1
It is dicult to estimate to what extend existing renewable energy poli-
cies are eciency-based (i.e. addressing further externalities besides carbon
pricing) or driven by pragmatic second-best considerations to reduce emis-
sions. Nevertheless, existing renewable energy policies are also criticized by
economists as being inecient or ineective. Nordhaus (2009) advocates to
treat technologies and innovations in all sectors of the economy equally, i.e.
avoid technology discrimination. He advises to concentrate on establishing a
global carbon price. Sinn (2008b,a) criticizes `demand-side policies' like re-
newable energy subsidies as they could lead to an accelerated fossil resource
extraction. Generally, many economists recommend to favor an ecient rst-
best policy over an inecient second-best approach { without quantifying the
respective eciency losses of the latter.2
This paper steps into this gap by considering second-best alternatives to
carbon pricing and weighing (theoretical) eciency against (practical) feasi-
bility aspects. For this purpose, we assume that possible secondary market
failures like innovation spillovers or network eects are completely internal-
ized by rms or already addressed by additional rst-best policies. Hence,
renewable energy technologies are not subject to uncorrected additional mar-
ket failures besides the climate target which rules out the implementation
of renewable energy subsidies for eciency reasons. Instead, we consider
a second-best (i.e. the welfare maximizing) renewable energy subsidy when
carbon pricing is missing, delayed or imperfect. We further analyze a second-
1Farmer and Trancik (2007), for example, estimate that the \costs of reaching parity
between photovoltaics and current electricity prices are on the order of $200 billion" {
which is 1.4% of U.S. GDP in 2009.
2Fischer and Newell (2008) are a notable exception as they calculate the costs of achiev-
ing certain emission reductions with second-best policies. Likewise, Galinato and Yoder
(2010) focus on revenue-neutral second-best tax-subsidy combinations to reduce carbon
emissions.
3best feed-in-tari system and carbon trust scheme where fossil tax income
is used to cross-nance renewable energy subsidies. We evaluate these in-
struments with respect to their impact on welfare, resource rents and energy
prices compared to an optimal carbon pricing scheme as ecient rst-best
benchmark. By calculating optimal second-best instruments we provide a
valuable numerical estimation of the (optimistic) least-cost potential of these
emission mitigation instruments. Furthermore, we assess the robustness of
renewable energy subsidies and elaborate the risk of \green paradoxes" due
to slightly mal-adjusted subsidies. One of the key ndings of our paper is
that permanent renewable energy subsidies are a very poor and risky sub-
stitute for missing or imperfect carbon prices. Mitigation costs increase by
a multiple if no carbon price is available for variations in a wide range of
plausible parameters. Additionally, subsidies that deviate only slightly from
the optimal subsidy can lead to a severe increase in emissions or to high con-
sumption losses. Hence, although high carbon prices are hard to establish in
reality, permanent subsidies are no practical alternative. However, feed-in-
tari systems, carbon trusts or temporary subsidies combined with long-term
carbon pricing can be designed in a way to ease distributional con
icts at
reasonable additional costs.
We perform our analysis within an integrated policy assessment model
described in Kalkuhl et al. (2011). The model provides a consistent and 
ex-
ible framework to calculate optimal policies and to conduct a precise welfare
analysis. Sec. 2 introduces the economic sectors and the relevant basic equa-
tions. In our intertemporal general equilibrium model, we consider three
stylized energy technologies: (i) a fossil energy technology causing carbon
emissions, (ii) a renewable energy technology with high learning-by-doing
potential, and (iii) a nuclear power technology as a capital-intensive non-
learning carbon-free technology. An intertemporal fossil resource extraction
sector is integrated to account for possible supply-side responses to climate
policies as motivated by Sinn (2008b). The model is parameterized on a
global-economy scale to reproduce business-as-usual and mitigation scenarios
from typical integrated assessment models. The global dimension is crucial
for appropriately considering the intertemporal supply-side dynamics of fossil
resource owners. Although policies have to be implemented nationally, con-
sidering the global perspective gives a useful upper bound for the eciency
of second-best instruments. In contrast to Kalkuhl et al. (2011), we assume
no additional market failures for learning technologies. Instead, we explore
the potential of several renewable energy subsidies (presented in Sec. 3) to
compensate for missing or suboptimal carbon prices in order to achieve am-
bitious mitigation targets. In Sec. 4, the impact of these second-best policies
on welfare, rents and energy prices is discussed. Subsequently, the sensitivity
4and robustness of second-best subsidies is analyzed. Finally, we conclude our
paper by summing up important insights and implications for climate policy.
2 The model
We use an intertemporal general equilibrium model that distinguishes a
household, a production sector, fossil resource extraction and several energy
sectors. In addition to energy generated by combustion of fossil resources,
there are two carbon-free energy sources: a non-learning nuclear energy sec-
tor, and a more expensive yet learning renewable technology with a high
cost-decreasing potential. A further sector extracts fossil resources from a
nite resource stock. We assume standard constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions which are given in detail in the appendix. Fig. 1
gives an overview of the technology used.
The mitigation target is expressed by an upper bound for cumulative
extraction. The government, which anticipates the equilibrium response of
the economy, imposes policy instruments on the economy to maximize welfare






















Figure 1: Technology of the model and key elasticities of substitution between production
factors.
52.1 The economic sectors
In the following, we concentrate on a short description of the agents' opti-
mization problem and the interplay with the government's policies. A de-
tailed and more formal description of production technology, market equilib-
rium and parameter choices can be found in Kalkuhl et al. (2011).
The representative household
We assume a representative household with the objective to maximize the








The factor  denotes the length of a time period in years and  is the pure
rate of time preference.
The household owns labor L, capital stocks Kj, and the rms, and there-
fore receives the factor incomes wL and rKj, as well as the prots of all rms
j, where j 2 fY;F;R;N;Lg enumerates the sectors (consumption good sec-
tor Y , fossil energy sector F, resource extraction sector R, nuclear energy
sector N, renewable energy sector L). Wage rate w, interest rate r, prots
j and lump-sum transfers from the government   are taken as given. The
household is assumed to take the depreciation of capital at rate  into ac-
count in its investment decision. The household therefore faces the following
constraints:











Kj;t+1 = Kj;t + (Ij;t   Kj;t); K0 given (3)
The production sector
The representative rm in the consumption good sector maximizes its prot
Y by choosing how much capital KY and labor L to deploy, and how much
energy to purchase from the various sources: fossil fuels, nuclear power and
renewable energy (EF, EN, and EL, respectively). It has to consider the pro-
duction technology Y() and the given factor prices for capital (r), labor (w),
3In the following, we often omit the time-index variables t in the main text to improve
readability.
6fossil (pF), nuclear (pN) and renewable (pL) energy (the price of consump-
tion goods is normalized to one). Furthermore, the production sector may
need to consider government intervention in form of a subsidy on renewable
energy L or a feed-in tari &F. The latter takes the form of a subsidy but is
cross-nanced by a tax F on energy from the fossil and the nuclear energy
sectors.
Y;t = Y(KY;t;Lt;EF;t;EL;t;EN;t)   rtKY;t   wtLt   (pF;t + F;t)EF;t
  (pL;t   &F;t   L;t)EL;t   (pN;t + F;t)EN;t (4)
The nested CES production function Y(Z(KY;AYL);E(EF;EB(EL;EN)))
combines the inputs capital-labor intermediate and energy, assuming an elas-
ticity of substitution of 1. Capital and labor are combined to an intermedi-
ate input Z using the elasticity of substitution 2; similarly, fossil energy and
backstop energy are combined to nal energy with the elasticity of substitu-
tion 3. Finally renewable and nuclear energy are combined to an aggregate
backstop energy EB using the elasticity of substitution 4.4 Population L
and labor productivity AY grow at an exogenously given rate.
The fossil energy sector
The fossil energy sector maximizes prots F with respect to capital KF
and fossil resource use R, subject to the CES production technology EF and
given factor prices for fossil energy, capital and resources (pR). Additionally,
it may consider a carbon tax R:
F;t = pF;tEF(KF;t;Rt)   rtKF;t   (pR;t + R;t)Rt (5)
The fossil resource sector
The fossil resource sector extracts resources from an exhaustible stock S
using capital KR. Its objective is to maximize the sum of prots over time,







s=0 [1 + (rs   )]
 
4We do not integrate fossil, renewable and nuclear energy on the same CES-level be-
cause we assume that substitutability between the two backstop energies EL and EN
should be higher than between a backstop and a fossil energy EB and EF. This is due to
the fact that in many integrated assessment models backstop energy is considered as part
of the electricity sector while fossil energy covers electric as well as non-electric energy
consumption. The substitutability between electric and non-electric energy technologies,
however, is worse than between electric energy technologies (see also Kalkuhl et al. 2011).
7Resource owners purchase the capital used in the extraction process at the
market interest rate. The productivity of capital (S) decreases with ongoing
depletion of the exhaustible resource stock, implying increasing unit extrac-
tion costs (Rogner 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). The resource sector,
therefore, has to take into account the following constraints:
R;t = pR;t(St)KR;t   rtKR;t (6)
St+1 = St   Rt; St  0; S0 given (7)
The renewable energy sector
The renewable energy sector maximizes prot L using capital KL and a
xed amount of land Q. It considers the interest rate and renewable energy












1    rtKL;t (8)
Ht+1 = Ht + (EL;t   EL;t 1); H0 given (9)







 and converges to AL;max when H ! 1. This formulation is based
on Arrows's learning-by-doing approach (Arrow 1962) and is widely used in
energy economic models (e.g. Kverndokk and Rosendahl 2007; Fischer and
Newell 2008). 
 is a scaling parameter, and 
 is the learning exponent.
The latter is related to the learning rate lr by 
 =  ln(1   lr)=ln2, which
measures by how much productivity increases when cumulative capacity is
doubled.
The nuclear energy sector
The nuclear energy sector maximizes prot N subject to capital input KN
with an AK-technology function:
N;t = pN;tAN;tKN;t   rtKN;t (10)
2.2 The government
In this study, we are interested in optimal rst-best and second-best policies
and their impact on welfare. We therefore calculate the Stackelberg equilib-
rium where a welfare-maximizing government selects the optimal trajectory
8of policy instruments from a pre-dened subset of available policy instru-
ments given the implicit reaction functions of the economic sectors (see for
example Dockner et al. (2000, p. 111)).
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) of the previously described sectors
(that are listed in detail in Kalkuhl et al. (2011)) dene an intertemporal
market equilibrium for given policy instruments. The government considers
all technology constraints, budget constraints, equations of motion, and rst-
order and transversality conditions and chooses policy instruments (and not
investment and extraction) to maximize welfare. Furthermore, the govern-
ment balances income and expenditure at every point in time with house-
holds' lump-sum tax  .
 t = N;tEN;t   L;tEL;t + R;tRt + B;t (11)




Rt  B (12)
Considering the amount of cumulative emissions of the next decades is a ro-
bust indicator for achieving the two-degree target (Meinshausen et al. 2009).







subject to Eqs. 1{12, 16{21, FOCs
 is the set of government policies and comprises all variables the government
has direct access to, e.g. carbon taxes R, renewable energy subsidies L and
fossil energy taxes F. The description of concrete policies  used in this
paper follows below (Sec. 3).
2.3 Calibration and implementation of the model
Model parameters are chosen from Kalkuhl et al. (2011). We use a carbon
budget of 450 GtC as climate stabilization target for the mitigation sce-
nario. This limits global warming to 2￿C above the pre-industrial level with
a probability of roughly 50 %.5 The endogenous fossil energy price starts
5The chosen carbon budget refers to the entire planning horizon. For B = 450, the
resulting cumulative emissions for 2010{2050 are 337 GtC. Together with cumulative 2000{
9at 4 ct/kWh in 2010 and increases up to 8 ct/kWh in 2100 (under business
as usual) due to increasing extraction costs. The cost of nuclear energy is
mostly constant at 15 ct/kWh which is at the upper bound of the IEA's
cost estimate (IEA 2010) that ignores external costs of nuclear power, e.g.
external costs due to the limited accident liability for operators.6 For renew-
able energy we consider a 17% learning rate which leads to generation costs
of 9 ct/kWh in 2100. Initially, the generation costs are around 28 ct/kWh.
The chosen parameterization implies that renewable energy is the dominat-
ing backstop technology under an optimal mitigation policy while nuclear
energy plays a limited role.7
In this paper, we focus on the costs of alternative policies to carbon
pricing in the absence of additional externalities in the renewable energy sec-
tor. Hence, we assume perfect anticipation of learning and therefore neglect
potential spillover externalities for learning technologies. The optimization
problem as dened by (13) forms a non-linear program which is solved nu-
merically with GAMS (Brooke et al. 2005).
3 Policy instruments and evaluation criteria
In the introduction we mention several arguments why an ecient carbon
price { be it a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme { may be dicult
to implement in reality. Hence, policy makers might prefer to use renewable
energy subsidies as a practical second-best alternative. In this section, we
consider the optimal carbon tax as a benchmark and several second-best
policies promoting renewable energy:
￿ Optimal carbon tax (mitigation benchmark)  = fR;tg: The optimal
carbon tax R;t is the rst-best instrument as it achieves the mitigation
target at least costs and re-produces an economic outcome identical to
a social planner economy if no further market failures exist (Kalkuhl
et al. 2011). The carbon tax increases with the interest rate as it
2009 emissions of 77 GtC (Boden et al. 2010), 2000{2050 emissions are 414 GtC. Mein-
shausen et al. (2009) suggest that limiting cumulative emissions for 2000{2049 to 392 GtC
yields a 50% probability of not exceeding the two-degree target. This probability increases
to 75% if cumulative 2000{2049 emissions are lower than 273 GtC.
6Heyes and Heyes (2000) estimate the magnitude of the implicit subsidy to be 0.01{3.58
ct/kWh for nuclear reactor operators in Canada.
7If market failures distort the anticipation of future learning benets in the renewable
energy sector, however, nuclear energy becomes temporarily dominant (see Kalkuhl et al.
(2011), where the same model framework is used).
10resembles a Hotelling price for the scarcity of the carbon budget.8 The
revenues are lump-sum transferred to households via  t.
￿ Feed-in-tari (FIT)  = fF;t;&F;tg: A tax F;t on fossil and nuclear
energy is used to cross-nance a subsidy &F;t on renewable energy and
to limit fossil resource use. The FIT is implemented as income-neutral
policy for the government due to &F;tEL;t = F;t(EF;t + EN;t). It is
calculated to achieve the mitigation target at maximum welfare without
an additional carbon price and lump-sum taxes ( t = 0).
￿ Carbon trust  = fR;t;L;tg: For this policy instrument, the revenues
of carbon pricing R;t are spent completely to subsidize renewable en-
ergy L;t, implying L;tEL;t = R;tRt and  t = 0.9 This instrument
diers from the FIT only in that not fossil and nuclear energy but
fossil resources (i.e. emissions) are taxed.
￿ Renewable energy subsidy  = fL;tg: A subsidy L;t on renewable
energy is calculated that achieves the climate target at highest welfare.
The subsidy is nanced by lump-sum taxation  t of the household. No
additional carbon price or energy tax is employed.
￿ Subsidy with constant carbon tax  = f R;L;tg: An exogenously
given, constant carbon tax  R together with a welfare-maximizing sub-
sidy on renewable energy L;t is employed to achieve the climate target.
Additional lump-sum transfers  t are allowed.
￿ Temporary subsidy policy that is displaced by a carbon price: tt0 =
fL;tg and t>t0 = fR;tg. Hence, for t  t0 there is no carbon price
(R;tt0 = 0) and for t > t0 there is no subsidy (L;t>t0 = 0). This
instrument is appropriate if substantial carbon pricing is not politically
feasible in the short run or if there is a long regulatory phase-in.10 In the
long run, however, carbon pricing will be implemented and subsidies
become obsolete.
8The optimal carbon tax is also equivalent to the permit price that evolves under a
carbon bank which manages the carbon budget intertemporally (Kalkuhl et al. 2011).
9This instrument leans on the atmospheric trust proposal by Barnes et al. (2008). It
considers an emissions trading scheme where the revenues from auctioning are partly used
to promote renewable energy technologies.
10Such a gradual phase-in of regulation can be motivated by distributional concerns
(Williams III 2010). Introducing the ecient level of Pigovian taxes immediately devalues
past investments into physical and human capital that are related to fossil energy use.
These investments had taken place under the prospect of missing Pigovian taxes.
11￿ Finally, a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario is considered where the
cumulative carbon budget constraint (12) is relaxed and government
intervention is absent, implying  = ;.
These policies are evaluated with respect to their impact on (i) intertemporal
welfare, (ii) fossil resource and renewable rents and (iii) energy prices. While
the analysis of intertemporal welfare measures the eciency of instruments
to achieve the mitigation budget, the consideration of fossil resource and
renewable rents and energy prices indicates possible distributional con
icts
provoked by these policies. Usually, we will compare second-best policies with
the rst-best mitigation policy  = fR;tg (carbon pricing). However, it will
also be interesting to compare second-best policies with the BAU outcome
in order to identify policies making factor owners or energy buyers better o
under the mitigation goal.
Intertemporal welfare In order to compare the intertemporal welfare
of several policies we use balanced growth equivalents (BGE) as introduced
by Mirrlees and Stern (1972). As we use a discrete time model, we adopt
the modied calculation of Antho and Tol (2009). The BGE 
 is dened as
an exponentially increasing consumption path (with 
 as initial consumption
level and an exogenously given constant growth rate) that generates the same
discounted utility as the original consumption path. Hence, we compare the
relative BGE dierences for the rst-best policy  and the second-best policy























  1  = 1
(14)
where W() denotes the resulting intertemporal welfare under policy .
By considering the relative dierence 
 of the two BGEs for  and 0,
the growth rate of the exponentially increasing reference consumption path
becomes irrelevant (see Antho and Tol (2009) for an analytical derivation).
In contrast to a discounted consumption measure that uses an exogenously
given discount rate, the BGE does not change the welfare ordering of policy
outcomes. It translates welfare losses into appropriate consumption losses
which occur once and forever. In other words, the BGEs measure the costs
of a policy like a (non-recycled) tax levied on consumption.
The welfare dierence of a policy compared to the BAU scenario is de-
noted in the following as mitigation cost. The welfare dierence of a second-
best policy compared to the optimal rst-best mitigation policy (carbon pric-
ing) is denoted as additional second-best cost.
12Rent dynamics Fossil resource rents are simply given by R from (6). The
associated land rent Q for renewable resources is calculated by the product
of land Q with the scarcity price for land pQ = pL
@EL
@Q , thus, Q = pQQ.11
Energy prices As energy from dierent sources is imperfectly substitutable,
prices for fossil and renewable energy dier. Therefore, we calculate an av-
erage energy price ~ pE;t by the fraction of total energy expenditures and total
energy consumption Et:
~ pE;t =
pF;tEF;t + pL;tEL;t + pN;tEN;t
Et
(15)
By comparing this average energy price, we analyze the impact of policies on
energy prices.
4 Renewable energy subsidies in case an op-
timal carbon tax is not available
In the following we analyze the performance of mitigation policies that focus
on renewable energy deployment. First, we study several second-best poli-
cies with respect to welfare, rent distribution and energy prices. Next, we
consider how important key parameters in
uence the welfare losses of renew-
able energy subsidies (Sec. 4.2). Finally, we consider small deviations from
the optimal second-best subsidy and their impact on welfare and emissions
(Sec. 4.3).
4.1 Ranking of second-best policies
Impact on welfare
Fig. 2 shows the welfare losses of the policies described in Sec. 3 compared
to the business-as-usual scenario without a mitigation target (BAU) and to
the optimal rst-best mitigation policy (optimal carbon tax). The mitigation
costs under an optimal carbon pricing policy are 2.3%. Hence, introducing a
carbon budget reduces the consumption level of a balanced-growth path by
11The intertemporal learning-by-doing technology complicates the rent dynamics in the
renewable energy sector. As the renewable energy price entails also the value of future cost
reductions, it is lower than the current-period generation costs. Hence, negative prots
arise in early decades. By considering the land rent Q only, we abstract from the dicult
technological rent dynamics and focus on the rent of limited natural resources.
132.3%. These costs increase to 3.1% under a FIT and to 2.9% under a car-
bon trust. The higher mitigation costs occur because taxing fossil energy or
fossil resource use always implies a signicant subsidy for renewable energy
by the cross-nancing mechanism. This subsidy, however, is not necessary
because further market imperfections (besides the mitigation target) are ab-
sent. Hence, the subsidy leads to distortions and reduces welfare { albeit the
quantitative eects remain small. The FIT provokes higher welfare losses
than the carbon trust because fossil and nuclear energy is taxed instead of
fossil resource use and because not all cost-eective re-allocation possibilities














































Welfare losses in BGE consumption losses [%]
Compared to optimal carbon pricing policy
Compared to BAU (no policy)
Figure 2: Welfare losses (in BGE) for several policies.
A pure subsidy policy, however, increases mitigation costs substantially
to 15.4%. If a low constant carbon price is imposed consumption losses
remain at high levels. High constant carbon taxes can decrease the additional
second-best costs { although, for constant carbon taxes higher than 750$/tC,
consumption losses begin to increase. Finally, a temporary subsidy which
is displaced by a carbon price in the long run provokes higher additional
costs the longer carbon pricing is absent. If carbon pricing is implemented
after 20 years, additional costs are marginal (0.2%). If, in contrast, carbon
pricing is implemented after six decades, additional second-best costs become
substantial (3.8%).
12In particular, the fossil energy tax fails to decrease carbon intensity in the fossil energy
sector by higher capital input. Even without the cross-nancing mechanism (i.e. &F = 0),
mitigation costs of an optimal second-best fossil energy tax are 2.6% implying welfare
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Figure 3: Decomposition of the net resource price under business-as-usual and under an
optimal carbon pricing policy.
Impact on rents
Climate policy does not only aect the welfare of the representative house-
hold. It also changes rents and factor prices associated with the consumption
of carbon and energy. In particular, mitigation lowers the rent associated
with the scarcity of fossil resources because the scarcity of the atmospheric
deposit becomes more severe due to ambitious mitigation targets. This can
be seen very illustratively in Fig. 3,where the net fossil resource price is de-
composed into its basic components. In the BAU scenario, the resource rent
forms a signicant part of the resource price the energy sector has to pay for.
This changes under an optimal carbon pricing scheme; In the long run, the
carbon price virtually determines the net resource price and, thus, demand
for fossil resources. In the rst decades { when the carbon price is low {,
extraction costs also play an important role. Fossil resource scarcity rents,
however, have only a marginal impact on the net resource price.
The mitigation policy decreases the rent per unit of extracted fossil re-
sources as well as the amount of cumulative fossil resource extraction. Un-
der a business-as-usual policy, the scarcity of fossil resources generates rents
higher than one percent of GDP for resource owners (Fig. 4). In contrast, fos-
sil resource rents shrink dramatically for optimal rst-best as well as second-
best policies. Interestingly, the revenue-neutral feed-in-tari and the carbon
trust policy lead to higher short-term fossil resource rents than the optimal
carbon pricing policy: The cross-nancing mechanism of the carbon trust
initially leads to lower carbon taxes which imply a higher resource extraction






















































































Figure 4: Fossil resource and renewable (land) rent for several policies for the years 2020,
2050 and 2080.
carbon price in the long-term lead to higher short-term rents. The prospect
of future high carbon taxes can induce an accelerated resource extraction
exceeding even the business-as-usual extraction for the initial period where
no carbon price is implemented (cf. Sinn 2008b). The temporary subsidy,
however, weakens this eect although the short-term resource extraction is
higher than under the optimal carbon pricing policy. In contrast, perma-
nent renewable energy subsidies that are nanced by lump-sum taxes reduce
fossil resource rents even to a greater extend than an optimal carbon price.
Hence, the political economy argument that subsidies provoke less resistance
because no rm takes a higher explicit nancial burden is 
awed. From the
resource owners' perspective, a feed-in-tari, a carbon trust or a temporary
subsidy policy is preferable to an optimal carbon pricing policy { and carbon
pricing is preferable to a permanent subsidy policy.
While owners of fossil resources lose under all mitigation policies, owners
of land used for renewable energy generation prot substantially. Extensive
renewable energy subsidies can more than double the land rent associated
with renewable energy generation compared to a carbon pricing policy. If
subsidies are only temporary, the gains for land owners are moderate and
return to the level of the rst-best mitigation policy after subsidies have
been cut.
Impact on energy prices
As argued in the introduction, distributional concerns are one important
reason for the high opposition against carbon prices. Beside resource rents,
mitigation policies also change energy prices. First, carbon pricing and fossil
16energy taxation (FIT) clearly increase fossil energy prices. On the contrary,
subsidies on renewable energy decrease fossil energy prices (for an explanation
see below). Hence, households and consumers using large amounts of fossil
energy face less energy expenditures under a pure renewable energy subsidy
policy. Secondly, renewable energy prices decrease for all mitigation policies
(partly due to induced learning-by-doing, partly due to paid subsidies).13
While the cost decrease is smallest for an optimal carbon tax, it is most
pronounced under a pure subsidy policy. Finally, the development of average
energy prices is shown in Fig. 5. The ecient carbon tax leads to high
energy prices { almost double as high as in the business-as-usual scenario.
The FIT and the carbon trust imply lower energy prices, although higher
than in the BAU scenario. Temporary subsidy policies can reduce energy
prices near to or below business-as-usual prices as long as subsidies are paid.
After replacing the subsidy by a carbon price, energy prices increase sharply
up to the energy price under an optimal carbon pricing scheme. Thus, a
temporary subsidy eectively delays the cost increase (and the associated
distributional con
ict). The permanent subsidy policy leads to energy prices
that are always lower than without mitigation. Note that in the very long
run, energy prices under carbon pricing policies are not substantially higher
than in the BAU scenario.14 Constant carbon taxes increase the short term
energy prices until subsidies have expanded to compensate for low carbon
prices.
Hence, when rms or households cannot be compensated for higher energy
prices resulting from mitigation targets, feed-in-taris, a carbon trust or a
temporary subsidy policy might be a pragmatic alternative to an optimal
carbon pricing policy.
4.2 What determines the second-best costs of renew-
able energy subsidies?
If no tax on carbon or fossil energy is available, renewable energy net prices
have to become very low in order to crowd out fossil energy. It is important
to note that the subsidy has to be higher than the dierence between fossil
and renewable energy prices due to the (i) extraction cost dynamics, (ii) the
fossil resource rent dynamics and (iii) the imperfect substitutability between
energy technologies: The less fossil resources are extracted, the lower are the
13Recall that fossil and renewable energy are good but not perfect substitutes. Prices
therefore dier.
14First, fossil energy is more expensive in the BAU scenario because extraction costs
increase due to high cumulative extraction. Second, learning-by-doing reduces the costs
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Figure 5: Average energy prices according to Eq. (15) under dierent policy regimes
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Figure 6: Impact of renewable energy subsidies on (a) fossil and renewable energy prices
and on (b) fossil and renewable energy generation.
unit extraction costs as the capital productivity  of the extraction industry
decreases with cumulative extraction. Second, fossil resource owners receive
a smaller scarcity rent per unit extracted resources (see Fig. 3) because fossil
resources become abundant compared to the tight carbon budget under the
mitigation policy. Fig. 6a indicates how renewable energy subsidies reduce
fossil energy prices below BAU prices due to the supply-side dynamics of
fossil resources. However, Fig. 6a also shows that the subsidy is so high
that it pushes the renewable energy price far below the fossil energy price.
This is necessary because both energy technologies are good, but not perfect
substitutes: It is dicult, for example, to decarbonize the transportation
sector by increasing renewable energy subsidies because fossil fuel is not
always replaceable by energy from wind, solar or biomass. The fact that
the renewable energy price has to be far below the BAU price of fossil energy
18leads to an enormous energy demand (Fig. 6b). As a great part of the GDP is
now shifted into the energy sector to generate immense amounts of renewable
energy consumption falls dramatically which explains the high welfare losses
in Fig. 2.
In order to analyze the sensitivity of the consumption losses of a pure
renewable energy subsidy, we calculate the mitigation costs for an optimal
carbon pricing policy and the additional second-best costs for a variation in
several economic parameters. Tab. 1 lists the results for parameters describ-
ing fossil resource reserves (S0), substitutability between fossil and back-
stop energy (3) total energy demand (AL;max;1), backstop energy costs
(AL;max;;AN), normative parameters (;) and the mitigation target (B).
By varying all these parameters we nd that the additional second-best
costs due to the subsidy are in most cases higher than 5%. A lower fossil
reserve size S0 leads to higher resource extraction costs as resource sites that
are dicult to access have to be exploited earlier (see also Eq. 22). Fur-
thermore, resource rents increase due to the higher scarcity. With increasing
extraction costs, the subsidy performs better as the fossil energy net price
increases in a similar way than under carbon taxes. High fossil energy prices,
however, require lower subsidies { which leads to fewer distortions. Addition-
ally, a high substitutability 3 between fossil and backstop energy reduces
the price gradient at which renewable energy crowds out fossil energy. An
increase in labor growth productivity ^ AY implies a higher energy demand in
the BAU scenario. This exacerbates the distortions created by the subsidy
policy. In the BAU scenario and under the optimal carbon pricing policy a
higher substitutability 1 between nal energy and capital and labor reduces
the energy demand as it becomes easier to substitute expensive energy by
capital and labor. Large renewable energy subsidies, on the contrary, lead
to a higher energy demand for higher 1 as labor and capital is substituted
by cheap energy. Hence, the second-best costs of renewable energy subsidies
increase in 1.
If the generation costs of non-learning backstop energy are low (i.e. AN
is high), the technology forms a signicant part of an optimal energy mix
under an optimal carbon pricing policy. A pure renewable subsidy policy,
however, favors renewable energy against both, fossil and nuclear energy. The
discrimination against nuclear energy increases the additional second-best
costs the cheaper the nuclear energy is. Low generation costs for renewable
energy (high AL;max and ) generally reduce the mitigation costs. As the cost
dierence for fossil and renewable energy decreases, lower renewable energy
subsidies are necessary to achieve the mitigation goal. This implies lower
additional second-best costs.
Normative preferences in
uence optimal investment and extraction deci-
19Fossil resource stock [GtC] S0 5000 4000* 3000 2000 1000
Mitigation costs [%] 2.55 2.34 2.01 1.47 0.48
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 11.68 11.27 10.45 8.56 3.56
Fossil-backstop substitutability 3 3* 4 5 6
Mitigation costs [%] 2.34 2.63 2.78 2.85
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 11.27 9.19 8.05 7.31
Initial labor productivity growth rate ^ AY 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.024 0.026* 0.028
Mitigation costs [%] 1.92 2.06 2.2 2.29 2.34 2.38
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 7.39 8.42 9.54 10.51 11.27 14.27
(KL){E substitutability 1 0.3 0.4 0.5* 0.6 0.7
Mitigation costs [%] 3.75 2.96 2.34 1.84 1.45
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 8.58 9.99 11.27 12.5 13.73
Nuclear energy productivity AN 0.15 0.2* 0.25 0.3 0.35
Mitigation costs [%] 2.37 2.34 2.22 1.99 1.69
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 11.18 11.27 11.48 11.79 12.12
Renewable energy productivity AL;max 0.6* 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Mitigation costs [%] 2.34 1.87 1.47 1.17 0.93
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 11.27 8.36 6.38 4.98 3.95
Cobb-Douglas exponent for renewable energy  0.85 0.9 0.95* 1
Mitigation costs [%] 3.46 3.14 2.34 1.56
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 41.96 21.47 11.27 6.04
Pure social time discount rate  0.01 0.02 0.03* 0.04 0.05
Mitigation costs [%] 3.48 2.94 2.34 1.76 1.27
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 18.7 14.68 11.27 8.47 6.29
Risk aversion  1* 1.5 2 2.5 3
Mitigation costs [%] 2.34 1.87 1.39 1.02 0.74
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 11.27 9.02 6.82 5.36 3.92
Carbon budget [GtC] B 250 350 450* 550 650 750
Mitigation costs [%] 4.2 3.09 2.34 1.8 1.4 1.09
Additional 2nd-best costs [%] 18.45 14.32 11.27 8.92 7.07 5.6
Table 1: Mitigation costs (welfare losses of the optimal carbon pricing policy relative
to the BAU scenario) and additional second best costs (welfare losses of the
pure subsidy policy relative to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for several
parameter variations. The asterisk is assigned to the value used for the standard
parameterization.
20sions of market agents as well as the policy trajectory and the performance of
policies. A higher discount rate reduces mitigation costs because the costs of
transforming the energy system are shifted into the far-distant future where
they are heavily discounted: Extraction is accelerated and the deployment of
learning technologies delayed which increases consumption in early decades
at the expense of subsequent decades. This intertemporal re-allocation oc-
curs under an optimal carbon price as well as under the second-best subsidy.
As the higher far-distant costs are stronger discounted for higher discount
rates, (discounted) welfare losses decrease in . A higher elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption  penalizes an unequal distribution of con-
sumption in time. Within our growth model, consumption grows even under
the mitigation target, though growth rates are smaller. Mitigation mainly
reduces future consumption (due to higher costs in the energy system) when
the society became more productive. Therefore, limiting fossil fuel use re-
duces the inequality in the consumption trajectory. Hence, a higher  leads
to lower welfare losses { both under an optimal carbon pricing as well as
under a second-best subsidy policy. Finally, ambitious mitigation targets
(implemented by a low carbon budget B) increase the second-best costs of
the subsidy as higher renewable energy subsidies are required to crowd out
fossil energy use.
Fig. 7 compares the (optimal) mitigation costs with the additional second-
best costs of the renewable energy subsidy from Tab. 1. It becomes apparent
that the second-best costs of the subsidy policy correlate positively with the
mitigation costs { except for three parameter variations. The positive corre-
lation implies that the costs of the subsidy policy are moderate when climate
protection does not place a signicant burden on the economy. In this case,
carbon pricing has only marginal distributional impacts through increasing
energy prices. The rational for choosing renewable energy subsidies instead
of the ecient carbon pricing policy becomes obsolete in this case. Only
for three parameter variations, higher mitigation costs correlate with lower
second-best costs of the subsidy policy. If nal energy is to a smaller extent
substitutable by labor and capital (low 1), if fossil energy and backstop en-
ergy are very good substitutes (high 3), and if the non-learning backstop
energy generation is expensive (low AN) the additional second-best costs of
the subsidy policy could become small.
4.3 The risk of green paradoxes
Motivated by the green paradox of Sinn (2008b) we study the impact of
suboptimal subsidies on emissions and consumption. Again, we assume the

















































Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis for a renewable subsidy policy. The welfare losses of a
pure renewable subsidy policy compared to an optimal carbon pricing policy
(additional 2nd-best costs) are shown as well as mitigation costs of an optimal
carbon pricing policy compared to the BAU scenario. Parameter variations
correspond to Tab. 1.
450 GtC mitigation target. Next, we calculate subsidies that deviate slightly
from the optimal subsidy by a xed ratio, e.g. a ratio which is 1% lower than
the optimal subsidy at each period in time. The optimal subsidy and the
perturbations are shown in Fig. 8a. Finally, we impose the perturbed sub-
sidies into the model (still without a carbon price) and compare the impact
on cumulative emissions and welfare of these subsidies (Fig. 8b).
The numerical calculations show that the economy responds very sensi-
tively on changes of subsidy levels. For a subsidy which is only 2% lower
than the optimal subsidy, consumption increases by 2.4% and cumulative






























































































































Figure 8: (a) Optimal subsidy and perturbations. (b) Impacts of perturbed subsidies on
consumption and emissions.
22trast, the implementation of a subsidy which is 2% higher than the optimal
one, decreases consumption by 3.2% and cumulative emissions by 17.0%.
Hence, a slightly higher subsidy causes additional consumption losses and
a slightly lower subsidy leads to far more emissions. Without any carbon
price, the renewable energy subsidy is not only a very expensive instrument.
It is also a dangerous instrument because it can provoke unintended side-
eects on emissions if the regulator deviates only slightly from the optimal
tax.
5 Conclusions
Our analysis provides some valuable information for policy makers struggling
with introducing high carbon prices. For a wide range of parameters, using
permanently renewable energy subsidies instead of carbon prices to achieve
mitigation implies disastrous welfare losses: they are multiple times higher
than rst-best mitigation costs under a carbon price policy. Even if constant
carbon prices are feasible, the subsidy cannot correct the suboptimal carbon
price at low costs. Although renewable energy becomes cheaper due to sub-
sidies and learning-by-doing, it is dicult to crowd out fossil energy supply.
Resource prices decrease due to the supply-side dynamics of fossil resource
extraction. And the good { but not perfect { substitutability between energy
technologies requires to maintain a high price dierential between renewable
and fossil energy. Achieving the cost break-through is therefore not su-
cient. If the substitutability between fossil and renewable energy is high, the
second-best costs decrease substantially. Hence, a sectoral policy approach
with renewable energy subsidies in the electricity sector (where technologies
are almost perfect substitutes) and carbon taxes in the industry sector may
decrease the second best-costs.
A low fossil resource base and low renewable energy generation costs re-
duce the second-best costs { though the mitigation costs fall dramatically in
these cases and a carbon pricing policy only has a marginal impact on the
economy. Distributional con
icts due to carbon pricing do not arise for these
parameter settings. While renewable energy subsidies indeed lower energy
prices even below the business-as-usual prices, the government has to raise
taxes on households to nance these subsidies. Furthermore, fossil resource
owners lose more rents under a renewable subsidy policy than under a carbon
pricing policy. Hence, at a second glance, a subsidy-only policy may provoke
even higher resistance of the fossil industry than a carbon tax. Permanent
renewable energy subsidies are not only an expensive choice to reduce emis-
23sions. They are also a very risky instrument because small deviations from
the second-best optimum lead to strong responses in emissions and welfare.
If the subsidy was set 2% below its optimal value, emissions would increase
by 18%. In contrast, if the subsidy was set 2% above its optimal value, wel-
fare would decrease by an additional 3% due to an over-ambitious emission
reduction.
There are some attractive alternatives to a pure carbon pricing policy.
The feed-in-tari and the carbon trust policy cause only small additional
costs. Even if no market failures besides the mitigation target exist, redi-
recting the revenues of a fossil energy tax (FIT policy) or carbon tax (carbon
trust policy) to the renewable sector reduces consumption by 0.8% (FIT) and
0.5% (carbon trust) compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy. In this
case, fossil resource rents are higher and energy prices lower than under ef-
cient carbon pricing. If additional market failures in the renewable energy
sector exist (like spillover externalities for innovations), the carbon trust may
even be welfare-increasing compared to a pure carbon pricing policy. Finally,
temporary subsidies delay or ease distributional con
icts provoked by high
energy prices and low fossil resource rents due to carbon pricing. A subtle
combination of short-term renewable energy subsidies and long-term carbon
prices can achieve the mitigation target at moderate costs { although fossil
resource owners may slightly accelerate resource extraction in the short term.
Renewable energy subsidies are an ecient policy instrument when they ad-
dress market failures directly associated with renewable energy technologies
or markets. However, if renewable energy subsidies aim to reduce carbon
emissions because carbon prices are missing or too low, welfare losses can
be substantial. In particular, if mitigation imposes a severe constraint on
the economy { i.e. if fossil resources are abundant and cheaply available
compared to renewable energy generation { a subsidy policy creates high
additional consumption losses. The results of this paper show that without
a careful policy analysis, pragmatic policy approaches may turn out to be
a fatal aberration for mitigating global warming as costs explode. In order
to achieve mitigation targets at low costs, there seems to be no way around
direct or indirect carbon pricing { at least in the long run.
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